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Abstract—The ubiquity of smartphones, and their very broad
capabilities and usage, make the security of these devices tremen-
dously important. Unfortunately, despite all progress in security
and privacy mechanisms, vulnerabilities continue to proliferate.
Research has shown that many vulnerabilities are due to
insecure programming practices. However, each study has often
dealt with a specific issue, making the results less actionable for
practitioners.
To promote secure programming practices, we have reviewed
related research, and identified avoidable vulnerabilities in
Android-run devices and the security code smells that indicate
their presence. In particular, we explain the vulnerabilities,
their corresponding smells, and we discuss how they could
be eliminated or mitigated during development. Moreover, we
develop a lightweight static analysis tool and discuss the extent
to which it successfully detects several vulnerabilities in about
46 000 apps hosted by the official Android market.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smartphones and tablets have recently overtaken the number
of computers. They provide powerful features once offered
only by computers, but the risk of vulnerability on these
devices is not on a par with traditional desktop programs;
smartphones are increasingly used for security sensitive ser-
vices like e-commerce, e-banking, and personal healthcare,
which make these multi-purpose devices an irresistible target
of attack for criminals.
The recent survey on the Stackoverflow website shows that
about 65% of mobile developers work with Android.1 This
platform has captured over 80% of the smartphone market,2
and just its official app store contains more than 2.8 million
apps. As a result, a security mistake in an in-house app may
jeopardize the security and privacy3 of billions of users.
The security of smartphones has been studied from var-
ious perspectives such as the device manufacturer [41], its
platform [44], and end users [16]. Manifold security APIs,
protocols, guidelines, and tools are proposed. Nevertheless,
security concerns, in effect, are outweighed by other con-
cerns [6]. Many developers undermine their significant role
in providing security [42]. As a result, apps still suffer from
serious proliferating security issues.4 For instance, the analysis
of 100 popular apps downloaded at least 10M times, revealed
that over 90% of them, due to development mistakes, are prone
1http://insights.stackoverflow.com/survey/2017
2http://www.gartner.com
3In short, referred to as security in this paper
4http://www.cvedetails.com
to SSL vulnerabilities that allow criminals to access credit card
numbers, chat messages, contact list, files, and credentials [27].
Given these premises, the primary goal of this work is to
shed light on the root causes of programming choices that
compromise users’ security. In contrast to previous research
that has often dealt with a specific issue, we study this phe-
nomenon from a broad perspective. We introduce the notion
of security code smells i.e., symptoms in the code that signal
the prospect of a security vulnerability. We have identified
avoidable vulnerabilities, their corresponding smells in the
code; and discuss how they could be eliminated or mitigated
during development. We have also developed a lightweight
static analysis tool to look for several of the identified security
smells in 46 000 apps. In particular, we answer the following
three research questions:
• RQ1: What are the security code smells in Android apps?
We have reviewed major related work, especially those
appearing in top-tier conferences/journals, and identified
28 avoidable vulnerabilities and the smells that indicate
their presence. We thoroughly discuss each smell, the
risk associated with it, and its mitigation during app
development.
• RQ2: How prevalent are security smells in benign apps?
We have developed a lightweight tool that statically
analyzes apps for the existence of ten security smells.
We applied the tool to a repository of about 46 000 apps
hosted by Google. We realized that despite the diversity
of apps in popularity, size, and release date, the majority
suffer from at least three different security smells.
• RQ3: To which extent identifying security smells facil-
itates detecting vulnerabilities? We manually inspected
160 apps, and compared our findings to the result of the
tool. Our investigation showed that the identified smells
are in fact a good indicator of security vulnerabilities.
To summarise, this work represents an initial effort to spread
awareness about the impact of programming choices in making
secure apps. We argue that this helps developers who develop
security mechanisms to identify frequent problems, and also
provides developers inexperienced in security with caveats
about the prospect of security issues in their code.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We
present the identified vulnerabilities and corresponding secu-
rity smells in section II. We study the prevalence of these
smells and discuss the results in section III. We summarize
the work closely related to this paper in section IV, and we
conclude the paper in section V.Preprint – SCAM 2017
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II. SECURITY SMELLS
Although Android security is a fairly new field, it is very ac-
tive, so researchers in this area have published a large number
of articles in the past few years. We were essentially interested
in any paper explaining an issue, or a countermeasure that
involves the security of apps in Android. We used a keyword
search over the title and abstract of papers in IEEE Xplore
and ACM Digital Library, as well as those indexed by the
Google Scholar search engine. We formulated a search query
comprising Android and any other security-related keywords
such as security, privacy, vulnerability, attack, exploit, breach,
leak, threat, risk, compromise, malicious, adversary, defence,
or protect. We read the title and, if necessary, skimmed the
abstract of each paper and included security-related ones. We
further read the introduction of these papers and excluded
those whose concerns were not about app security. In order to
extend the search, for each included paper we also recursively
looked at both citations and cited papers. Finally, we carefully
reviewed all remaining papers. During the whole process, we
resolved any disagreement by discussion.
We identified 28 smells that may lead to vulnerabilities
in Android-powered devices.5 We group these smells into
five categories. We explain each smell, its consequence i.e.,
potential risk, and its symptom i.e., an identifiable property in
the code. We also mention any possible resolution i.e., a more
secure practice to eliminate or mitigate the issue during app
development.
A. Insufficient Attack Protection
• Unreliable Information Sources
Developers acquire their programming knowledge from
various sources such as official documentations, books,
crowd sources, etc. Issue: According to recent research,
developers increasingly resort to studying code examples
provided by informal sources like StackOverflow, which
are easy to access and integrate, but often lack security
concerns [3]. Consequently, vulnerabilities could make
their way into apps in the absence of security expertise.
Symptom: Existence of copy-pasted code from untrust-
worthy sources. Mitigation: Use official sources which
are more reliable, and vet the security of any external
code before and after integration in your code.
• Untrustworthy Libraries
Developers cope with the complexity of modern software
systems and speed up the development process by relying
on the functionalities provided by off-the-shelf libraries.
Issue: Many third-party libraries are unsafe by design i.e.,
introduce vulnerabilities and compromise user data [37].
Consequently, the ramification of adopting such libraries
could be manifold. Symptom: The app utilises unsafe
libraries such as advertising libraries that are known to be
prone to data leakage [11]. Mitigation: Solely use reliable
libraries [5].
5We define vulnerability as a security issue that compromises user’s security
and privacy.
• Outdated Library
The risk of using third-party libraries is not resolved
by only using trusted libraries per se. Issue: Libraries
usually offer various bug fixes and improvements in
newer releases, but often different developers maintain
libraries and apps, and their update cycles generally
do not coincide. Consequently, a security breach in an
old library or a deprecated API could lead to serious
issues. Symptom: An included library is behind the latest
release, or the app exercises a deprecated API that is
not maintained anymore (e.g., the SHA1 cryptographic
hash function). Mitigation: Integrate the latest release of
a library into your app and replace deprecated APIs with
their newer counterparts. Publish an update not only when
the app itself has some improvements but also when there
is a new version of a library which the app uses.
• Native Code
Developers often incorporate native code in their apps
to perform intensive computations or to use many third-
party libraries which exist in this form. Issue: Native
code is hard to analyze; there is no distinction between
code and data at the native level, and attackers can load
and execute code from native executables, in a variety of
ways much easier than in Java. Consequently, native code
is susceptible to severe vulnerabilities like buffer over-
flow, and an attacker could exploit such vulnerabilities,
for instance, to execute malicious code [36]. Symptom:
Existence of native code or a native code library in the
app. Mitigation: Use native code only when necessary,
and only integrate trustworthy libraries [5] into your code.
• Open to Piggybacking
Android apps are often easy to repackage. Issue: Ad-
versaries could add their malicious code to a benign
app before repackaging it [19]. Consequently, depending
on the original app’s popularity, users can be infected
when installing a seemingly benign app that has evaded
the analyses of leading app markets [7]. Symptom: No
technique (e.g., watermarking, signature checking) is
applied to hardening repackaging. Mitigation: Leverage
obfuscation to make retro-engineering of apps harder.
Also, verify the app’s authenticity before any sensitive
operation.
• Unnecessary Permissions
The use of protected features on Android devices requires
explicit permissions, and developers occasionally ask
for more permissions than necessary [32]. Issue: The
more permission-protected features an app can access, the
more sensitive data it can reach. Consequently, a more
permission-hungry app may expose users to additional
security risks [33]. Symptom: The manifest file contains
permissions for APIs that are not used. Mitigation: Utilize
tools like PScout6 to exclude from the manifest file any
permission whose corresponding API calls are absent in
the app.
6http://pscout.csl.toronto.edu
B. Security Invalidation
• Weak Crypto Algorithm
The fundamental set of cryptograph algorithms can be
categorized into symmetric, asymmetric, and hash func-
tions. Issue: Each category includes several algorithms,
each of which may have various features and attack
resilience. Consequently, incautious adoption of an algo-
rithm could subject to security issues. Symptom: The use
of weak cryptographic hash functions like SHA1 or MD5,
insecure modes e.g., ECB for block ciphers. Mitigation:
Consult the state of the art guidelines to choose an
appropriate cryptography, and utilize expert systems [4].
• Weak Crypto Configuration
The majority of security breaches come from exploit-
ing developer’s mistakes. Issue: Cryptography APIs are
widely perceived as being complex with many confusing
options [23]. Consequently, a strong but poorly config-
ured algorithm could jeopardise the in-place security.
Symptom: Each algorithm has different parameters, and
cryptographic parameters in each library could have dif-
ferent defaults. PBE (password-based encryption) with
fewer than 1000 iterations, short keys and salts, or
none random seeds and initialisation vectors are common
mistakes. Mitigation: Use libraries that provide strong
documentation and working code examples, and rely on
simplified APIs with secure defaults [2].
• Unpinned Certificate
Digital certificates are needed to ensure secure communi-
cation. Unpinned certificates are easy to maintain and are
frequently used in the appified world [26]. Issue: Ensur-
ing the authenticity of a certificate is non-trivial, if it is
not pinned. Consequently, an app may inadvertently end
up trusting a certificate issued by an adversary who has
intercepted network communication. Symptom: The app
uses unpinned certificates. Mitigation: Pinning certificates
are always recommended to increase the security.7
• Improper Certificate Validation
Android provides a built-in process for validating the
certificates signed by the trusted Certificate Authori-
ties (CA). Issue: In other cases, e.g., when a certi-
ifcate is self-signed, the OS devolves this validation
process to the app itself. However, developers often
fail to implement it properly [12]. Consequently, this
leaves the communication channel over SSL/TLS inse-
cure and susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks [9].
Symptom: The presence of a X509TrustManager or
a HostNameVerifier that does not perform any
validity check. The TrustManager may only use
checkValidity to assess the expiration of a certificate
without any further check, e.g., verifying the certificate’s
signature or asking the user consent to trust a self-signed
certificate. Overridden onReceiveSslError in Web-
View which ignores any certification errors. Mitigation:
7Since Android 6.0 pinning can be enabled using the Network
Security Configuration feature.
Ensure the certificate chain is valid i.e., the root certificate
of the chain is issued by a trusted authority, none of the
certificates in the chain are expired, and each certificate
in the chain is signed by its immediate successor in
the chain. Moreover, the certificate should match its
designated destination, i.e., the “Common Name” field or
the “Subject Alternative Name” in the certificate should
match the domain name of the server being connected
to. Finally, utilize network security testing tools like
“Nogotofail”8 to examine your communication.
• Unacknowledged Distribution
Google Play, Google’s official marketplace for Android,
strives to identify potential security enhancements when
an app is uploaded to it. However, developers may
distribute their packages via other channels to circum-
vent out-of-order updates, bypassing the slow release
cycles and security restrictions of this market place.
Issue: The protection provided by Google, including
code and signature checks, is neglected. Consequently,
the risk of distributing a vulnerable app increases
especially when the app utilises uncertified libraries,
or in a worse case, an attacker can replace installa-
tion packages with malicious ones [48]. Symptom: The
android.permission.INSTALL_PACKAGES per-
mission exists in the manifest. Mitigation: Distribute your
apps and updates exclusively through official app stores
that perform security checks.
C. Broken Access Control
• Unauthorised Intent Receipt
An intent is an abstract specification of an operation that
apps can use to utilise the actions provided by other
apps. An explicit intent guarantees communication with
the specified recipient, but it is the Android system that
determines the recipient(s) of an implicit intent among
available apps. Issue: Any app that declares itself able
to serve the requested operation is potentially eligible
to fulfill the intent. Consequently, if such an app is
malicious, a threat called intent hijacking could arise in
which user information carried by the intent could be
manipulated or leaked [8]. Symptom: The existence of an
intent with private data, but without a particular compo-
nent name (the fully-qualified class name). Mitigation:
Only use explicit intents for sending sensitive data. In
addition, always validate the results returned from other
components to ensure they comply with your expectation.
• Unconstrained Inter-Component Communication
One app can reuse components (e.g., activities, services,
content provider, and broadcast receivers) of other apps,
provided those apps permit it. Issue: Android apps are
independently restricted in accessing resources. Conse-
quently, a threat called component hijacking arises when
a malicious app escalates its privilege for originally
prohibited operations through other apps that access those
8https://github.com/google/nogotofail
operations [40], [10]. Symptom: The existence of the
intent-filter element or android:exported
= true attribute in the manifest file without any permis-
sion check to ensure that a client app is originally permit-
ted to receive that service. Mitigation: Exclusively export
components that are meant to be accessed from other
apps and avoid placing any critical state changing actions
within such components. Enforce custom permissions
with the android:permission attribute to prohibit
access from apps with lower privileges. Finally, use
tools like IccTA, which detects flaws in inter-component
communication [17].
• Unprotected Unix Domain Socket
Android IPCs do not support cross-layer IPC, i.e., com-
munication between an app’s Java and native process-
es/threads. To circumvent this limitation developers resort
to using Unix domain sockets. Moreover, developers may
reuse Linux code that already utilizes such sockets. Issue:
Developers are barely guided to protect Unix domain
sockets with appropriate authentication. Consequently,
adversaries are capable of abusing these exposed IPC
channels to exploit vulnerabilities within privileged sys-
tem daemons and the kernel [31]. Symptom: The server
socket channel accepts clients without performing any
authentication or similarly a client connects to a server
without properly authenticating the server. Mitigation:
Enforce proper security checks when using the sockets.
• Exposed adb-level Capabilities
Android Debug Bridge (adb) is a versatile tool that pro-
vides communication with a connected Android device.
Many developers opt for adb-level capabilities to legiti-
mately access a subset of signature-level resources [20].
Issue: For this purpose, an app communicates locally with
an adb-level proxy through the TCP sockets opened on
the same device, which exposes the adb server to any app
with the INTERNET permission. Consequently, a malign
app with ordinary permissions can command the adb and
establish serious attacks [14]. Symptom: The existence of
adb-specific commands or TCP connection to local host
in the code. Mitigation: Avoid using adb-level capabilities
in your app, as it is also prohibited since Android 6.0.
• Debuggable Release
During app development there exist two major build
configurations, debug and release. The first is meant
for active development, while the latter is for signed
in-market releases. However, developers may forget to
switch to release mode before publishing an app [43].
Issue: Apps shipped with debugging enabled always try
to connect to a local Unix socket opened by the Android
Debug Bridge (adb). While adb is not running on every
consumer device, a malign app could disguise itself as
an adb service and connect to random debuggable apps.
Consequently, a malicious app is able to gain full access
to the Java process and can execute arbitrary code in the
context of the debuggable app [1]. Symptom: The mani-
fest file contains the attribute android:debuggable
= true. Mitigation: The debug mode should be disabled
in the signed release version i.e., either the debuggable
attribute should not exist in the manifest file, or its value
should be false. More recent build environments already
perform this task automatically.
• Custom Scheme Channel
Scheme channels (a.k.a protocol prefixes) like
fblite:// for Facebook allow seamless interactions
between web and Android apps. Issue: The sender of
a scheme message is not able to verify the recipient
of the message so that malign apps could register
themselves as a receiver of another app’s unified
resource identifier (URI) scheme. Consequently,
adversaries could collect access tokens or other sensitive
information [35]. Symptom: The registration of a URI
scheme within the intent-filter in manifest file.
The SchemeRegistry.register method is in the
code. Mitigation: Adopt the dedicated system scheme
i.e., Intent which is harder to compromise.
D. Sensitive Data Exposure
• Header Attachment
The header section of data transport protocols like HTTP
comprises key/value pairs to store operational parameters.
Issue: Developers may rely on headers to transfer sensi-
tive data, e.g., they store credentials to auto-login into
a service. Consequently, any adversary eavesdropping
on the network may easily access the attached data
[35]. Symptom: Calls like HttpGet.addHeader()
are present in the code to store private data. Mitigation:
Do not store sensitive data in headers, instead rely on
dedicated mechanisms like OAuth2 protocol9 to authen-
ticate to third-party services.
• Unique Hardware Identifier
Each device often has a couple of globally unique identi-
fiers such as the IMEI number, MAC address, etc. Issue:
For various purposes like user profiling, apps utilize these
IDs, which are tied to each device. Consequently, anyone
in the possession of such IDs would be able to track
the user’s activities across various sources. Symptom:
Method calls that return IDs from associated classes like
TelephonyManager or BluetoothAdapter exist
in the code. Mitigation: Use the UUID.randomUUID()
API to ensure that the retrieved ID is globally unique for
each user, but only within the same app identity.
• Exposed Clipboard
Users usually rely on a clipboard to copy and paste data
across apps. Issue: The clipboard content is readable and
writable by all apps. Consequently, a malign app could
perform versatile attacks on the clipboard content from
URL hijacking to data exfiltration and code injection [46].
Symptom: The related calls on ClipboardManager
exist in the code. The app uses the common TextView
9https://oauth.net/2
and EditText controls, which allow copy and paste
to handle sensitive data [24]. Mitigation: Never allow
sensitive data to be copied and pasted in your app.
Perform input validation before exercising any input from
the clipboard.
• Exposed Persistent Data
Android provides various storage options to store per-
sistent data. These options vary depending on the size,
type, and accessibility of data.10 Issue: Developers may
opt for a particular option without considering its se-
curity implication. Consequently, they expose private
data. Symptom: The existence of a private storage with
global access scope (i.e., MODE_WORLD_READABLE or
MODE_WORLD_WRITEABLE) in the app. The app relies
on ContentProvider to access data, but there is no
access restriction for other apps. Mitigation: Specify
permissions to protect who can access your shared data.
Encrypt any (internally or esp. externally) stored sensitive
data, and place the encryption key in KeyStore, protected
with a user password that is not stored on the device.
• Insecure Network Protocol
Data transportation channels exist in various flavours,
and insecure ones like HTTP are more prevalent and
easy to maintain. Issue: Insecure channels transfer data
without encryption per se. Consequently, an attacker
can secretly relay the data and possibly alter it [27].
Symptom: APIs related to opening insecure network con-
nections like http or ftp exist in the code. Mitigation:
All app traffic should happen over a secure channel.
Otherwise, any sensitive data should be encrypted be-
fore it is sent out. Android 6.0 or above provides the
cleartextTrafficPermitted property which pro-
tects app from any usage of cleartext traffic.
• Exposed Credentials
Passwords, private keys, secret keys, certificates, and
other similar credentials are commonly used for au-
thentication, communication, or data encryption. Is-
sue: In some circumstances such data is inadvertently
disclosed to unauthorised parties. Consequently, this
could break the intended security. Symptom: The app
contains hard-coded credentials, or they are stored
without any password protection such as when the
KeyStore.ProtectionParameter is null. Miti-
gation: Store such data in a KeyStore in a protected
format which restricts unauthorised accesses.
• Data Residue
According to recent research, about 80% of abandoned
apps are likely to be uninstalled in less than a week [22].
Issue: After an app is uninstalled, various types of data
associated to the app, ranging from its permissions,
operation history, configuration choices, and so on may
still remain in a few system services [47]. Consequently,
such so-called “data residue” can be associated to another
10https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/data/data-storage.html
app and empower adversaries to access sensitive informa-
tion [45], [47]. Symptom: The app calls system services
that are known to be subject to data residue problem.
Mitigation: Unfortunately, an app may not always be
aware of its data being stored in system services, and
the mere mitigation is to avoid sharing private data with
these services, if possible.
E. Lax Input Validation
• XSS-like Code Injection
WebView is an essential component that enables de-
velopers to use web technologies such as HTML and
JavaScript to deliver web content within an app. Unlike
Web browsers like Chrome, FireFox, etc. which are
developed by well-recognized companies that we trust,
each app using a WebView is like a customized browser
which may not have undergone thorough security tests.
Issue: An app may load web content unsafely i.e., without
sanitising the input from any code. Consequently, an ad-
versary could inject malicious code through any channel
that the app uses to get web content [15]. Symptom:
The setJavaScriptEnabled call with value true
which enables execution of JavaScript exists in the code,
and the app fetches web content from untrustworthy
sources (e.g., by calling loadUrl or loadData on
WebView) without applying proper sanity checks. Mit-
igation: Invoke the default browser to display untrusted
data. Use a HTML sanitizer to filter out any code inside
the data, and show plain text only using safe APIs that are
immune to code injection (i.e., do not execute JavaScript
code). Beware of third-party libraries that employ Web-
View. Disable JavaScript, if you do not need it.
• Broken WebView’s Sandbox
There is a sandbox inside WebView that separates
its JavaScript from the rest of system. Issue: Web-
View provides an API, addJavascriptInterface,
through which an app can access Java APIs, and there-
fore mobile resources, from within JavaScript code in-
side the sandbox. Consequently, if the app renders the
web content unsafely, a code injection attack is pos-
sible [15]. Symptom: In addition to the symptoms of
the previous issue, the addJavascriptInterface
call exists in the code. Mitigation: Take into account
the suggestions of the previous issue, and as well use
the @JavascriptInterface annotation to specify
any method that is exposed by JavaScript to prevent
reflection-based attacks.
• Dynamic Code Loading
Android allows apps to load and execute external code
and resources. Issue: Although dynamic code loading
is widely adopted, developers are often unaware of the
risks associated to this generally unsafe mechanism or
fail to implement it securely [28]. An attacker can re-
place the code that is to be loaded with a malicious
one. Consequently, this can lead to severe vulnerabilities
such as remote code injection [13]. Symptom: Use of
any class loader in the code. In case of loading the
code and resources of another installed app, a call to
createPackageContext() on the Context object
exists in the code. Mitigation: Either bundle the required
resources within each app package, or verify the integrity
and authenticity of the loaded code e.g., by imposing
restrictions on its location or provenance [34]. Analyze
your app with the help of tools like Grab ’n Run [13].
• SQL Injection
Data-driven apps organize their data through a database.
Issue: An app might directly use inputs to build a query
that will be run by the database engine. Consequently,
an adversary who succeeds at inserting malicious code
into SQL statements, can access or modify database data.
Symptom: Inputs from untrustworthy sources are passed
to the database without proper validation. Mitigation: In-
stead of dynamic SQL generation, rely on parameterized
queries and stored procedures which let the database
distinguish between code and data. Validate inputs and
filter suspicious values e.g., escape characters to ensure
they do not end up in the query.
III. EMPIRICAL STUDY
We developed a lightweight analysis tool that statically
detects known security smells in an app. We rely on the Apk-
tool to reverse engineer Android apk files and generate smali
code.11 We defined a set of rules to capture the symptoms of
each security smell. In particular, we utilize Java XML Parser
for parsing the Manifest files and use regular expressions
to define and match the code pattern corresponding to the
identified symptoms of each smell in the code.
We randomly selected our apps from the AndroZoo
dataset.12 This dataset currently provides more than 5.5M apps
collected from several sources. We initially collected a random
subset of 70 000 apps whose sources are in Google Play.
However, to collect more meta data information such as an
app’s category, its number of downloads, update cycle, and
star rating we still needed to visit the Google Play website.
Unfortunately, we could not access 25 000 apps for various
reasons, for example, because they were no longer available
on the store, or they were not accessible from Switzerland.
In the end, we included 46 000 benign apps in our dataset.
About 90% of these apps were released between 2014 and
2016, a quarter of them were updated within three months, the
majority were rated more than four stars, slightly more than
27% were downloaded above 50 000 times, and the median
apk size was 5.5MB.
A. Result
We applied our lightweight tool to all apps in the dataset.
Figure 1 shows how prevalent the smells are in our dataset.
A majority of apps potentially suffer from XSS-like code
injection (85%) followed by dynamic code loading (61%).
11https://ibotpeaches.github.io/Apktool
12https://androzoo.uni.lu
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About 40% use custom scheme channels and expose a unique
hardware identifier. More than 12% use an insecure network
protocol, and almost 10% are subject to header attachment as
well as clipboard issues. Finally, just under 1% of the apps
have debug mode enabled.
We also studied how many of security smells usually appear
in the apps (see Figure 2). Only 9% of apps are free of any
smell, a majority i.e., above 50% suffer from at least three
different smells, and over a quarter are subject to more than
four smells, which is catastrophic.
We also investigated the prevalence of security smells at
different API levels as the proportion of devices running
different API versions varies. Figure 3 shows the distribution
of smells within each API level. We noticed that the prevalence
of Debuggable Release has been dramatically reduced. We
believe this is mainly due to the fact that Google market
no longer accepts apps in debug mode. We conjecture this
issue should have decreased also in other markets without this
constraint as recent build platforms automatically disable the
debug mode in the signed release version. In contrast, there is
an increase in the existence of the Exposed Clipboard security
smell. This could stem from the many sharing options for
social media in the apps. Similarly, the issue of Dynamic Code
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Fig. 4. Number of smells within each API level
Loading has become more common. We observed that many
developers adopt this feature to implement their own update
mechanisms.
Figure 4 shows how many of these classes of smells appear
within each API level. There is a correlation between feature
availability and feature usage, and apparently these uses have
introduced more insecurity. It seems the peak of issues was
reached around API level 15.
In the remainder of this section we discuss our findings from
a few more perspectives.
Category: Figure 5 shows the number of different security
smells appearing in the apps in each category. The apps in the
Libraries and Demo category are the most secure ones as they
usually rely on local content. We noted that security smells are
prevalent in gaming apps, and that Casino and Role Playing
games are more problematic. Finally, Dating as well Food and
Drink apps suffer from the highest number of security smells.
Popularity: Figure 6 shows the relationship between the
number of downloads and the security smells. The majority
of apps with millions of downloads suffer from five kinds of
smells. Although about 73% of apps within our dataset were
downloaded less than 50 000 times, there were still enough
apps with more downloads to conclude that the number of
downloads never guarantees security. Figure 7 shows the
relationship between the number of security smells and star
ratings. Despite the number of stars, apps often suffer from
three kinds of security smells. In particular, the star rating
correlates negatively with the presence of security smells. We
assume that the studied security smells are barely noticeable
by end-users, hence they are not reflected in the ratings.
Release date: We further studied whether the prevalence of
security smells changes over time. In fact, with advances in
developers support (e.g., tools, learning resources) we expected
that security smells in more recent apps should be rarer than
in older apps. Nonetheless, the result showed that neither the
number of smells nor the likelihood of a particular smell
relates to the release date of an app. Moreover, we noted
that in general the security of apps with short update cycles
is similar to those with longer update cycles. That is, either
security issues in one release still remain in future releases, or
they get fixed but new releases also introduce new smells.
App Size: We were interested to know whether existence
of security smells is ever related to the size of an app. Our
investigation showed that an app may suffer from various kinds
of security smells, despite its size. In fact, increase in app size
may only increase the frequency of a security smell. It is also
worth mentioning that some apps are larger not because of
having more code but other resources such as image, video
and audio content.
B. Manual Analysis
To assess how reliable these findings are to detect security
vulnerabilities, we manually analyzed 160 apps. For each
smell, we inspected 20 apps manually and compared our find-
ings to the result of the lightweight analysis tool. As is shown
in Figure 8, the results were encouraging. The manual analysis
completely agreed with the tool in the security risk associated
with six security smells. In case of exposed clipboard the tool
achieved a very good performance i.e., above 90% agreement
with the manual analysis. The level of agreement in insecure
network protocol and improper certificate validation was 80%.
We realized some apps use http connections to exclusively load
local contents which is legitimate in development frameworks
like Apache Cordova or Adobe PhoneGap. And some apps
implemented their own custom TrustManager which in fact
was secure. Finally, our tool was unable to correctly detect
the security risk associated with header attachment in 40% of
cases, which is mainly due to the fact that discerning data
sensitivity is non-trivial.
C. Threats to Validity
We note several limitations and threats to validity of the
results pertinent to our research. One important threat is the
completeness of this study i.e., whether we could identify
and study all related papers in the literature. We could not
review all the publications, but we strived to explore top-tier
software engineering and security journals and conferences as
well as highly cited work in the field. For each relevant paper
we also recursively looked at both citations and cited papers.
Fig. 5. Distribution of smells in app categories
Fig. 6. The relationship between number of smells and number of downloads
Moreover, to ensure that we did not miss any important paper,
for each identified issue we further constructed more specific
queries and looked for any new paper on GoogleScholar.
We analyzed the existence of security smells in the source
code of an app, whereas third-party libraries could also intro-
duce smells.
We were only interested in studying benign apps as in
malicious ones developers may not spend any effort to accom-
Fig. 7. The relationship between number of smells and app star ratings
modate security. Thus, we merely collected apps which were
available on official Google market. However, our dataset may
still have malicious apps that evaded the security checks of the
market.
Finally, the fact that the results of our lightweight analysis
tool are validated against manual analysis performed by the
authors is a threat to construct validity through potential bias
in experimenter expectancy.
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Fig. 8. The precision of obtained results
IV. RELATED WORK
Reaves et al. discussed Android specific challenges to pro-
gram analysis and assessed android application analysis tools,
and found that they mainly suffer from lack of maintenance,
and are often unable to produce functional output for appli-
cations with known vulnerabilities [29]. Li et al. studied the
state-of-the-art work that statically analyses Android apps [18].
They found that much of this work supports detection of
private data leaks and vulnerabilities, a moderate amount of
research is dedicated to permission checking, and only three
studies deal with cryptography issues. Unfortunately, much
state-of-the-art work does not publicly share their artefacts.
Linares-Vasquez et al. mine 660 Android vulnerabilities avail-
able in the official Android bulletins and the CVE-details
and present a taxonomy of the their types; they report the
presence of those vulnerabilities affecting the Android OS and
acknowledge that most of them can be avoided by relying on
secure coding practices [21]. Finally, Sadeghi et al. review 300
research papers related to Android security, and provide a tax-
onomy to classify and characterize the state-of-the-art research
in this area [30]. They find that 26% of existing research is
dedicated to vulnerability detection, but each study is usually
concerned with specific types of security vulnerabilities. Our
work expands on such studies to provide practitioners with an
overview of the security issues that are inherent in insecure
programming choices.
Some research is devoted to educating developers for secure
programming. Xie et al. interviewed 15 professional develop-
ers about their software security knowledge, and realized that
many of them have reasonable knowledge but do not adopt
it as they believe it is others’ responsibility [42]. Weir et al.
performed open-ended interviews with a dozen app security
experts, and identified that app developers should learn anal-
ysis, communication, dialectic, feedback and upgrading in the
context of security [38]. Witschey et al. surveyed developers
about their reasons for adopting and not adopting security
tools [39]. Interestingly, they found the perceived prestige of
security tool users and the frequency of interaction with secu-
rity experts more important to promote security tool adoption.
Acar et al. suggest a high-level research agenda to achieve
usable security for developers. They propose several research
questions to elicit developers’ attitudes, needs, and priorities
in the area of security [25]. Our work is complementary to
these studies in the sense that provides an initial assessment
of developers’ security knowledge, and as well highlights the
significant role of developers in making more secure apps.
V. CONCLUSION
In contrast to all advances in software security, software
systems are suffering from increasing security and privacy
issues. Security in Android, the dominant mobile platform,
is even more crucial as these devices often contain manifold
sensitive data, and a security issue in a small home-brewed
app can threaten the security of billions of users.
To fundamentally reduce the attack surface in Android, we
promote the adoption of secure programming practices. We
reviewed state of the art papers in security and identified 28
smells whose presence may indicate a security issue in an app.
We developed a static analysis tool to study the prevalence of
ten of such smells in 46 000 apps. We realized that despite
the diversity of apps in popularity, size, and release date, the
majority suffer from at least three different security smells.
Moreover, the manual inspection of 160 apps showed that
the identified security smells are actually a good indicator of
security vulnerabilities.
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